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NOTES
exists is the dear implication of the Howard case. However, at present,
there is no indicaiion that the courts are willing to establish a right to join
a union.
As a matter of prediction, the courts will probably continue to pay lip
service to the rule that a union may determine its own membership require-
ments, while at the same time widening the dudes of unions toward non-
members to a point where unions will have no other practical choice but to
admit non-members to membership.
HAROLD L TcKuN
The Accumulation of Contact Points Theory
In the Conflict of Laws
N O PROBLEM in the conflict of laws has caused more, confusion and
difficulty than the question of which jurisdictions law shall govern the
validity of a contract geographically contained within two or more juris-
dictions.
The numerous texts and treatises and the large number of cases on the
subject offer no rational method by which either layman or lawyer can pre-
dict with any certainty, in most instances, the ultimate ramifications of a
multi-jurisdictional contract - This is often true within the United States
even though the parties may know with absolute certainty the forum in
which any litigation pertaining to the contract will arise, for a single forum
may be so inconsistent with respect to its precedents that a given fact situ-
ation could be susceptible of, solution under any one of several rules or
theories ostensibly serving as general principles in solving the contract con-
flicts problem.'
Among the more recent theories to make an appearance is the accumu-
lation of contact points theory, also known as the center of gravity theory.
'In New York, for example, four separate and inconsistent rules are concurrently
in use. Which rule will be used in a given fact situation cannot be predicted, for
the cases offer no rationale. In F. A. Strause & Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry., 254
N.Y. 407, 173 N.E. 564 (1930), it was held that the law applicable to the contract
was the law of the place where the contract was made. In Manhattan Life Ins. Co.
v. Johnson, 188 N.Y. 108, 80 N.E. 658 (1907), it was held that the contract is
governed by the law of the place of performance. In Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co.,
150 N.Y. 314, 44 N.E. 959 (1896), it was held that the law of the place intended
by the parties governed the contract. In Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 280 App.Div.
348, 118 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1952), all of the various elements entering into the picture
were taken into consideration, and New York law was held to be determinative be-
cause the contract was more intimately connected with New York than with any
other jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has also employed several
theories in reaching its decisions. In Scudder v. Union National Bank of Chicago,
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Since this theory is an outgrowth of the failure of the traditional rules to
provide satisfactory explanations of contract conflicts cases, an examination
of these traditional rules and their shortcomings precedes the discussion of
the contact points theory.
Traditionally there have been three general rules, each with many vari-
ations, upon which the decisions have ostensibly been premised. These
rules are:
1. The validity of the contract is governed by the law which the parties
intend. This is the English view,2 and at one time it was rather widely
accepted in the United States,3 although its popularity in this country has
-somewhat diminished since the turn of the century.4 This rule is quite
satisfactory and workable where the parties have expressed their intent and
where the choice of law which the parties have made is bona fide and does
not offend public policy. Where the forum applies this expressed intent
ule, prudent men, at least, can make a contract, elements of which run to
,many jurisdictions, and still know with reasonable certainty that their ex-
pectations and intentions will not ultimately be frustrated by the applica-
tion of a law which neither party had contemplated.
The weakness of the English view manifests itself where the parties
have not expressed their intent. English courts attempt to solve this diffi-
.culty by imputing an intent, from facts and circumstances attending the
case,5 to parties who probably never thought about the law and had no actual
intent whatsoever with respect to it. Where the law embraces this pre-
sumed intent fiction, it does not provide parties to a contract with any
method by which they may know with certainty the rights which they pos-
sess and the obligations with which they are burdened under their contract.
2. The validity of the contract is governed by the law of the place
where the contract was made. This is the Restatement view and the most
popular American view.' It has substantial support among text writers,,
91 U.S. 406 (1875), it was held that the law of the place where the contract was
made governed a parol acceptance. In Hall v. Cordell, 142 U.S. 116, 12 Sup.Ct.
154 (1891), it was held that the place of performance governed the validity of a
contract. In Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 1 Sup.Ct. 102 (1882), the inten-
tion of the parties was held to govern.
'MORRIS, DIcEy'S CoNFLIcT OF LAws 579 (6th ed. 1949).
2 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAws 1173 (1935).
"Id. at 1172-1174.
'MORRIS, DiCnY's CONFLIcr OF LAws 589 (6th ed. 1949).
82 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAws 1079 (1935).
REsTArTMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 332 (1934).
8Gossard v. Gossard, 149 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1945); Keeha v. Charles J. Rogers,




and it does, admittedly, give contracting parties the advantage of knowing
which law will apply if there is, in fact, no question about where the con-
tract was made. However, the problem of where a given contract was made
is often, in itself, a question of considerable complexity and uncertainty.10
Numerous hypothetical situations and actual decisions may be used to
illustrate the inadequacy of the place of making rule as a general solution
to all contract conflicts problems. 1 To further complicate matters, some
courts purport to follow this rule, except where the contract is to be per-
formed elsewhere, in which case the law of the place of performance ap-
plies,1 2 and at least one jurisdiction accepts the place of making rule only
where there is nothing to indicate where the contract is to be performed.'3
3. The validity of the contract is governed by the law of the place of
performance. This rule finds acceptance in many American jurisdictions. 4
It is satisfactory where performance, or a substantial part thereof, will, in
fact, take place in a single jurisdiction. However, this very qualification is
its weakness. A wide variety of contracts, notably freight and transporta-
tion contracts, call for performance in a large number of jurisdictions as
well, in some instances, as upon the high seas. To determine where the
place of performance of contracts of this nature may be, with reference to
a single jurisdiction, is a problem that has not been consistently resolved
and cannot be so resolved because of the wide diversity in the fact situations
encountered.
These rules, in and of themselves, appear overly simple. However, as
has been indicated, the problems that arise under each or any of them when
one attempts to apply them to certain multi-jurisdictional contracts can be
exceedingly complex. These complexities, and the irreconcilable results
which they have precipitated even in the same jurisdcition,' 5 have led com-
mentators into what has been and continues to be a fruitless search for the
philosophers' stone which will inject into the law a modicum of consistency.
* 2 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAws 1171 et seq.; GOODRiCH ON CONFLICT OF
LAWs 321-323 (3d ed. 1949).
"' Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878); Illinois Fuel Co. v. Mobile & Ohio Ry.,
319 Mo. 899, 8 S.W.2d 834 (1928); University of Chicago v. Dater, 277 Mich.
658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936).
"See the discussion of this theory in STuMBERG, CONFLICr OF LAWs 226-232 (2d
ed. 1951).
"George Realty Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 275 Mich. 442, 266 N.W. 411 (1936);
Elk River Coal & Lumber Co. v. Funk, 222 Iowa 1222, 271 N.W. 204 (1937).
'Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick Co., 388 ILl. 474, 58 N.E.2d 460 (1945).
"Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Speer, 206 Ark. 216, 174 S.W.2d 547 (1943);
Reishley v. Continental IlL Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 390 Ill. 242 61
N.E2d 29 (1945); 2 BEALE, THE CoNFLICT OF LAws 1173 (1935).
"See note 1 supra.
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Recent thinking along this line has produced the accumulation of contact
points or center of gravity theory. 6 This theory has found favorable re-
ception among several writers17 and has been consciously applied by an ex-
tremely small number of courts' as a fourth theory for the solution of con-
tract conflicts problems.
The rule may be briefly stated as follows: The law which governs the
contract is the law of the jurisdiction with which the contract is most inti-
mately connected.
Fundamentally, this rule is no more than a synthesis of all the more
orthodox theories to which reference has been made and a variety of other
iactors as well. Under this theory, every significant contact which the con-
tract or any party to it has with any jurisdiction is taken into consideration.
The places of making and performance, the law which the parties intended
and the public policy of each jurisdiction involved are among the signifi-
cant contacts which are considered. There is, however, no authority which
even attempts to define what constitutes a significant contact within the
meaning of the rule; neither is there any authority establishing a definite
scale of values for the various contact points considered. The problem of
determining which contacts are significant and of establishing the relative
weight to be given to each rests entirely with the court, and upon the court's
application of these many differently weighted variables the decision will
turn.
In effect this theory operates in practically the same manner as the Eng-
lish imputed intent theory, with two exceptions: (1) Under the contact
points theory, the expressed intent of the parties as to what law should
govern would be taken into consideration only as an important contact.
The imputed intent doctrine, however, would never even apply where the
parties had expressed a jurisdictional choice, for the expressed intent would
govern, always providing, of course, that the public policy of the forum is
not offended.' 9 (2) The English imputed intent rule utilizes certain re-
"Thle origin of the theory is obscure. The earliest reference to an accumulation of
contact points theory, so named, that the writer could find is HARPER AND TAINToR,
CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 173 (1937).
17HARPER AND TAiNTOR, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAws 173-175 (1937); 2
RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAws 442-443, 480-484 (1947). Rabel's theory,
though not so named, is in essence the contact points theory.
"W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945); Rubin v.
Irving Trust Co., 280 App.Div. 348, 113 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1952); Jones v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 158 N.Y. Misc. 466, 286 N.Y. Supp. 4 (1936). In the latter case,
although the rule was applied, it was not decisive because the court was able to
reach the same result under any of the other three rules, all of which were discussed.
The accumulation of contact points theory was recognized but not applied by the
court in Jansson v. Swedish American Line, 185 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
"Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd. (1939) A.C. 277; MORRIS,
DIcEy's CONFLICT OF LAws 584 (6th ed. 1949).
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buttable presumptions in favor of important specific contacts in order to
guide the courts to results bearing some suggestion of consistency. Such
presumptions include the place of making and the place of performance
rules, which are utilized in the absence of countervailing circumstances.20
However, the contact points theory indulges no presumptions in favor of
any specific contact or contacts. The only remaining difference between
these two theories appears to be that the accumulation of contact points rule
is more aptly named.
The contact points theory is exceedingly broad. There are many deci-
sions, ostensibly decided under the traditional rules, that can be logically
explained under no other theory;21 and a very large number of the cases
which were decided under the traditional theories and can logically be ex-
plained under them can also be rationalized under the contact points theory.
This is, perhaps, the reason why the contact points theory has gained pro-
portionately more support from academic quarters than from any other, for
the scholar is more likely to be satisfied with a theory which logically ex-
plains what has already come to pass than is the jurist or practitioner, who
finds that the explanatory theory, however logical, furnishes no practical
standard by which contracting parties can avoid the pitfalls that may lead
them into litigation.
There are few American cases purporting to adhere to the contact points
rule; nor does there appear to be any significant trend in this direction. 22
The writer suggests that the apparent lack of enthusiasm for the rule, as
evidenced by the all but complete neglect of it on the part of the courts,
can be ascribed to two principal reasons: (1) In many instances, where the
courts have found it expedient to do so, they have, in fact, applied the con-
tact points theory, even though purporting to use one of the traditional
theories.23 This subterfuge makes it unnecessary for them to disturb es-
tablished precedent by announcing a new rule. (2) As a guidepost for
those who seek to determine just what their ultimate rights and obligations
under a contract may be, the contact points theory has nothing to offer ex-
cept more of the wild confusion with which the law is already amply sup-
plied in this quarter.
"MoRIus, DicEy's CONFLIcr OF LAWs 593-594 (6th ed. 1949).
See note 23 infra.
See note 18 suopra
See the introductory note in HARPER AND TAINToR, CAsES ON CONFLICTS OF
LAWS 173-175 (1937). The following cases, which illustrate the point, are re-
printed following the note: Liverpool & Great Western S.S. Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co.,
129 U.S. 397, 9 Sup., Ct. 469 (1888); Io -re Missouri S.S. Co., 42 Ch.Div. 321
(1888); Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co., 150 N.Y. 314, 44 N.E. 959 (1896); Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 55 Sup. Ct. 518 (1935);
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 54 Sup. Ct.
634 (1933).
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It is the writer's conclusion that the accumulation of contact points
theory, although it is quite useful for rationalizing a vast number of exist-
ing decisions, does. not recommend itself as a useful rule of law, for the rea-
son that it is no improvement upon the existing rules with respect to dear-
ing up the problems that parties attempting to interpret a multi-jurisdiction-
al contract would like to be able to anticipate.
The writer has no universal solution to offer for this problem but sug-
gests that the English rule, insofar as it permits the expressed intent of the
parties to govern where public policy is not offended, is manifestly fair to
the parties because it permits the foresighted man to know his rights and
anticipate his obligations. If the state whose law is chosen by the parties
as controlling has some reasonable relation to the contractual transaction,
most American courts would probably allow the express intent to govern.L2
Where the parties have not expressed a jurisdictional choice, it seems to
the writer that an arbitrary rule which establishes a definite standard is su-
perior to the contact points rule, which knows no certainty of standard.
Undeniably, the uniform application of an arbitrary rule will occasionally
result in windfalls for some and hardship for others. It must be conceded
that the application of the contact points rule might avoid these occasional
misfortunes precipitated by the application of an arbitrary rule. It seems
to the writer, however, that the application of the contact points rule would
create more hardships than it would avoid, for there is no guarantee that
even the most reasonable expectatons would not fall short of realization
under a rule that knows no standard beyond human discretion.
CHARLEs H. McCREA, JR.
'Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. New England Indust. Shares, 25 F.2d 493 (D.
Mass. 1928); Boole v. Union Maine Ins. Co., 52 Cal. App. 207, 198 Pac. 416
(1921); Smith v. Parsons, 55 Minn. 520, 57 N.W. 311 (1893); Brotherhood of
Railway Trainmen v. Adams, 222 Mo. App. 689, 5 S.W. 2d 96 (1928); Goode v.
Colorado Invest. Loan Co., 16 N.M. 461, 117 Pac. 856 (1911); Hurwitz v. Hur-
witz, 216 App. Div. 362, 215 N.Y. Supp. 184 (1926); Scott v. Perlee, 39 Ohio St.
63 (1883); Griesemer v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 10 Wash. 202, 38 Pac. 1031 (1894).
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